More than the duration of a single neural inhibitory process, and

More than the duration of a single neural inhibitory process, and researchers should consider at which processing stage(s) differences between groups orCognition. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 April 08.Verbruggen and LoganPageconditions arise (for a more elaborate discussion of this issue, see e.g. Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014).Author Manuscript Author Manuscript Author Manuscript Author Manuscript4. ConclusionAlmost every stop-signal paper assumes that going and stopping occur independently. Many papers have provided direct empirical and computational support for this assumption. Violations of the independence assumption have important theoretical implications, and practical implications for the estimation of the stopping latency. In the present study, we found dependence between stopping and going in selective stop tasks, especially when signal discrimination was difficult. We propose that in selective stop tasks, the decision to stop or not will share limited processing capacity with the go task. The limited processing capacity arises from competition between go and stop representations. The capacity sharing idea can account for performance differences between groups, subjects, and conditions. For example, when the decision is difficult, the go and stop task will have to share capacity for a longer period, resulting in longer RTs on signal trials. Our account can also explain why the go and stop tasks are largely independent in simple stop-signal tasks, since the decision to stop or not when a signal occurs is very simple in these tasks.Supplementary MaterialRefer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.AcknowledgmentsWe are grateful to Myriam Mertens, Rossy McLaren and Heike Elchlepp for help with the experiments, and we thank Iring Koch, Guido Band, and an anonymous reviewer for their insightful and constructive feedback. FV was supported by an Economic and Social Research Council Grant (ES/J00815X/1), an Outward Mobility Fellowship of the University of Exeter, and a starting grant from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement No. 312445. GDL was supported by Grant No. R01 EY021833 from the National Eye Institute.
Survival and reproduction require that an animal engage in social interactions. Such actions always include mating-related behaviors, but can extend to nurturance of offspring, alloparenting, cooperative defense and hunting, as well as formation and maintenance of hierarchies. Social participants can benefit in such contexts when aware of the affective state of others; for instance, if a calm infant becomes agitated, if companions increase vigilance to a threat or if a peer changes its receptivity toward play solicitations. Empathy, or expressing “an affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than to one’s own” (Hoffman, 2001), is a mechanism through which emotions can be shared (Preston de Waal, 2002). Behavioral mimicry is another way by which individuals can learn from others, but does not require emotion, and may be less beneficial than empathy when the social environment is variable or UNC0642 web difficult to predict (Nakahashi Ohtsuki, 2015). Comparative and Vesnarinone clinical trials evolutionary approaches to understanding empathy (Panksepp Lahvis, 2011; de Waal, 2012; Mogil, 2012; Panksepp Panksepp, 2013) indicate that it manifestsPanksepp and LahvisPageas a compilation of sub-processes (Preston de Waal,.More than the duration of a single neural inhibitory process, and researchers should consider at which processing stage(s) differences between groups orCognition. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 April 08.Verbruggen and LoganPageconditions arise (for a more elaborate discussion of this issue, see e.g. Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014).Author Manuscript Author Manuscript Author Manuscript Author Manuscript4. ConclusionAlmost every stop-signal paper assumes that going and stopping occur independently. Many papers have provided direct empirical and computational support for this assumption. Violations of the independence assumption have important theoretical implications, and practical implications for the estimation of the stopping latency. In the present study, we found dependence between stopping and going in selective stop tasks, especially when signal discrimination was difficult. We propose that in selective stop tasks, the decision to stop or not will share limited processing capacity with the go task. The limited processing capacity arises from competition between go and stop representations. The capacity sharing idea can account for performance differences between groups, subjects, and conditions. For example, when the decision is difficult, the go and stop task will have to share capacity for a longer period, resulting in longer RTs on signal trials. Our account can also explain why the go and stop tasks are largely independent in simple stop-signal tasks, since the decision to stop or not when a signal occurs is very simple in these tasks.Supplementary MaterialRefer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.AcknowledgmentsWe are grateful to Myriam Mertens, Rossy McLaren and Heike Elchlepp for help with the experiments, and we thank Iring Koch, Guido Band, and an anonymous reviewer for their insightful and constructive feedback. FV was supported by an Economic and Social Research Council Grant (ES/J00815X/1), an Outward Mobility Fellowship of the University of Exeter, and a starting grant from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement No. 312445. GDL was supported by Grant No. R01 EY021833 from the National Eye Institute.
Survival and reproduction require that an animal engage in social interactions. Such actions always include mating-related behaviors, but can extend to nurturance of offspring, alloparenting, cooperative defense and hunting, as well as formation and maintenance of hierarchies. Social participants can benefit in such contexts when aware of the affective state of others; for instance, if a calm infant becomes agitated, if companions increase vigilance to a threat or if a peer changes its receptivity toward play solicitations. Empathy, or expressing “an affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than to one’s own” (Hoffman, 2001), is a mechanism through which emotions can be shared (Preston de Waal, 2002). Behavioral mimicry is another way by which individuals can learn from others, but does not require emotion, and may be less beneficial than empathy when the social environment is variable or difficult to predict (Nakahashi Ohtsuki, 2015). Comparative and evolutionary approaches to understanding empathy (Panksepp Lahvis, 2011; de Waal, 2012; Mogil, 2012; Panksepp Panksepp, 2013) indicate that it manifestsPanksepp and LahvisPageas a compilation of sub-processes (Preston de Waal,.